By Stephen Leeb, Ph.D., and Megan Davis
During his recent summit with President Trump, Chinese leader Xi Jinping cautioned that both nations must make every effort to avoid the “Thucydides Trap.” Named after the ancient historian who argued that the Peloponnesian War was the inevitable result of a rising Athens power alarming an established Spartan power, the concept was popularized by Harvard scholar Graham Allison in his 2017 book, Destined for War. Allison examined 16 historical instances of a rising power challenging a ruling empire—beginning with Spain and Portugal in the late 15th century—and found that 12 ended in conflict while only four were resolved peacefully. While Allison’s analysis is a useful starting point, it ultimately fails to take into account some critical realities that bear closely on today’s geopolitical rivalries.
For one thing, Allison neglects the great-power rivalries that existed prior to the 1400s. More important, he fails to recognize that established powers frequently already are suffering from internal decay, which leaves them so vulnerable that conflict with a rising challenger becomes almost inevitable.
Consider that at the turn of the 20th century, Japan was able to defeat both China and Russia within the span of just over a decade. China and Russia were in the throes of corruption and decay. Russia was crippled by an out-of-date autocratic system, devastating poverty, systemic corruption, and severe economic strain. It also had been rapidly urbanizing, resulting in the creation of a deeply radicalized working class. In China, the Qing Empire spent the last half of the 1800s trapped in the “Century of Humiliation.” China decayed from structural decline, military stagnation, and foreign imperialism. While attempts at reform were made, the imperial system ultimately failed to modernize, leading to the collapse of China’s last dynasty.
But, while these two dynasties were falling apart, Japan had been completely revitalized by the Meiji Restoration. This pivotal era consolidated a fractured landscape of feudal domains into one unified nation, fostering a collective identity and culture centered around the Emperor Meiji. The back-to-back military triumphs over China and then Russia completely shifted the global balance of power, establishing the Empire of Japan as the dominant force in East Asia.
But the pendulum eventually swings the other way. The China of 100 years ago bears no resemblance to the China of today. The point is that in considering Japan’s victory over China and Russia, you must also consider not just the strengths of the rising power but also the vulnerability that the rot from within imposes on the ruling empire.
We could go on for many pages – indeed, many books – but you get the point: the Allison view is much too simple and generalized. We would offer that perhaps a more meaningful way to characterize the rising and existing powers would be in terms of cultures that are either reawakening or repressed.
In the early 1940s, an American culture built on the foundational ideals of Jefferson and Madison not only had weathered the Great Depression but also had fueled an era of immense innovation—producing everything from nylon and the car radio to the photocopier. Seen in this light, with this combined spirit of resilience and ingenuity, the nation’s success in World War II was hardly a surprise.
But the pendulum swings for everyone, and currently the United States is engaged in two separate conflicts: the war in Iran and, by proxy, the war in Ukraine. While these conflicts are often viewed as distinct, they are deeply interconnected—and China is the common denominator.
By many metrics, from economic output to trade dominance to technological innovation, China has achieved premier global status. Arguably, its military technology is now the world’s best. (The only reason “arguably” applies is that it hasn’t been tested in open combat, and open combat is the only real way of testing a country’s military.) All evidence points toward its being the best, however, as a test of a Chinese hypersonic missile around four years ago led General Mark Milley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to comment that the U.S. was facing a “Sputnik moment.” Clearly the case, as more than four years later hypersonic missiles remain largely aspirational in the U.S. Meanwhile, China has been able to marshal resources from education to culture, and Beijing’s infrastructure initiatives are uniting the Global South. China’s achievements combined with Russia’s massive resource endowment have created a duo that has no match.
China is not directly fighting in either the Iran or the Ukraine war. But it has a massive stake in their outcomes and is likely playing a significant role in both by providing weaponry and intelligence. If the U.S. prevails in either of the wars, or in both, it will likely preserve the geopolitical status quo – allowing Washington to maintain its global financial architecture, which in turn might let the U.S. check China’s rise for the next several years. But if China’s allies prevail in both, under China’s leadership the global financial system will shift rapidly, leaving America with a stark choice: cooperate with a new order, or perish economically.
It is not surprising that China has chosen not to fight. The country has long understood that domestic tranquility built around a deep-seated and spiritual culture is more important than foreign conquest. In fact, prioritizing domestic stability over foreign conquest is deeply rooted in Chinese history. In the 1400s, despite achieving immense global prestige, the legendary fleet of Admiral Zheng He was grounded by imperial decree because overseas expansion clashed with Confucian values – ideals that remain a cornerstone of Chinese culture today. The great fleet was redirected to coastal defense and eventually destroyed due to high maintenance costs.
The words of the 15th-century Hongwu Emperor still ring true in the China of today: “Some far-off countries pay their tribute to me at much expense and through great difficulties, all of which are by no means my own wish. Messages should be forwarded to them to reduce their tribute so as to avoid high and unnecessary expenses on both sides.” (‘Journal of the American Oriental Society’, July-September 1974, pgs. 347-359).
Esteemed scholar Ian Morris reaffirms this in his book: War! What is It Good For? in discussing the Chinese invention of firearms. As early as the 10th century, China was experimenting with gunpowder. Three centuries later—likely driven by a desire to liberate themselves from Mongol rule—the Chinese deployed the first practical military guns to expel their conquerors. By the end of the 14th century, China likely possessed the military capability to conquer the globe yet chose not to. This prompted Morris to ask what he calls “probably the most important question in the whole of military history”: “Why did China not keep its early lead in firearms and go on to wage its own Five Hundred Years’ War on the world?”
We think the simplest answer—that China was content to focus on internal growth rather than external conflict—is probably the correct one. Between 1368 and 1839, China’s military engagements were almost exclusively defensive.
From 1839 through the end of World War II, China suffered devastating defeats at the hands of British, European, and Japanese forces, all of which had rapidly outpaced China in firearms technology.
China emerged from this dark period with its deep culture intact but having learned a critical lesson: No longer could the country focus solely on internal growth without also translating that growth into powerful defenses against external threats. But unlike the examples Allison cited in his book, the China of today is inherently cooperative rather than expansionist. If history proves true, China is not interested in engaging in any war. For them, it is not a contest between a rising and a ruling empire. Their military buildup is a defensive shield in response to lessons learned, but the goal appears to be a world of sovereign, balanced powers working together toward global welfare, where mutual deterrence translates into shared global gains.
Given that our possible alternative futures include nuclear extinction or a resource-depleted dark age, arguing fiercely for global dominance seems absurd. Why in the world do we want to argue so fiercely? Why do some global powers seem to continue to choose confrontation over cooperation?
We don’t have the answers, but we pray that we don’t have to keep asking the questions.
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